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Normative Foundations for
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Hamish Stewart*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 provides
that “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure.” It is now well established that section 8 protects a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, but no more than that: state action
engages the section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure if,
but only if, it affects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.2 State
action that does not affect a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
even if called a “search” or a “seizure” in ordinary language and in
reasons for judgment, does not engage section 8. Put another way, if state
action affects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it must be
“reasonable” as that term is understood in section 8 jurisprudence: the
search must be authorized by law, the law authorizing the search must be
reasonable (i.e., constitutionally valid), and the manner in which the
search is conducted must be reasonable.3 A search that fails to meet any
one of these three criteria is unreasonable and violates section 8. But if
state action does not affect a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
it does not have to comply with section 8 and therefore does not have to
be shown to be reasonable. In particular, it does not have to be authorized

*

Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to Lisa Austin and Jamie
Cameron for their comments on a draft of this paper.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Some early cases leave room for the possibility that s. 8 might protect more than a reasonable expectation of privacy: see, for instance, Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Southam”]. This possibility has largely been disregarded in the more recent
cases on point.
3
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Collins”].
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by law.4 So the stakes in the determination of a reasonable expectation of
privacy are high.
What is a “reasonable expectation of privacy”? The Supreme Court
of Canada’s methodology for determining this question appears on the
surface to be well settled because the list of factors to be considered has
been clearly stated and restated in the leading cases. But it is not at all
clear how the relevant factors are supposed to contribute to a finding
concerning a reasonable expectation of privacy because there are (at
least) two distinct normative strands of argument at work in the cases. I
will call these strands “the risk approach” and “the surveillance approach”. Both approaches involve an assessment of the vulnerability of
the Charter applicant’s privacy to intrusion by others, but they emphasize
different aspects of this vulnerability. Under the risk approach, the most
important factors typically relate to the empirical ability of others,
whether they are state agents or not and whether they act lawfully or not,
to obtain access to the evidence or information. Questions of the ease or
difficulty of physical access and of whether the accused should be
deemed to have waived or abandoned his privacy therefore dominate the
analysis. Under the surveillance approach, the central question is whether
the investigative technique at issue intrudes on privacy in a manner that
raises constitutional concerns about its unfettered use. The most important factors typically relate to the impact of the technique on the values
protected by the privacy interest. But the Court has not clearly committed
itself to either approach, so even where the facts are essentially undisputed, it is difficult to anticipate whether the Court will find a reasonable
expectation of privacy because the different normative strands may
suggest different outcomes.
In this paper, I outline the two approaches and argue that the surveillance approach better reflects the values underlying section 8 of the
Charter because it highlights the central normative question: in light of
the reasons for recognizing a constitutionally protected privacy interest,
does our conception of the proper relationship between the state and the
individual permit the use of the investigative technique in question
without specific legal authorization? I then discuss two cases from 2010
in which the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether an accused
had a reasonable expectation of privacy: R. v. Nolet5 and R. v. Gomboc.6
4

R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 11 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Evans”].
5
6

[2010] S.C.J. No. 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nolet”].
[2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gomboc”].
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In Nolet, the Court was unanimous in recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the living area of a tractor-trailer. Though the main
issue in the case was the legality of the search, the Court’s holding
concerning the reasonable expectation of privacy is consistent with the
surveillance approach. But in Gomboc, the Court was seriously divided
as to whether the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information concerning the pattern of electricity usage in a residence.
The division of opinion illustrates both the striking differences between
the two approaches and the dangers to the value of privacy posed by the
risk approach.

II. A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
1. The Court’s Methodology
The standard methodology for determining whether a Charter applicant, typically an accused person,7 has a reasonable expectation of
privacy is as follows.8 A judge should consider the following questions:
•

Does the accused have a subjective expectation of privacy? While
this is a fact-specific question, the existence of a subjective expectation is readily inferred in many situations, e.g., where the place intruded upon is the accused’s home9 or body.
If the accused does have a subjective expectation of privacy, is that
expectation objectively reasonable? In deciding that question, a
judge should consider the totality of the circumstances, including
factors such as:10

•

7

A person does not have to be accused of an offence to claim a violation of his or her s. 8
rights. See, for instance, Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
3 (S.C.C.). However, I will generally refer to the Charter claimant as “the accused” because that is
the context in which the s. 8 right has developed. But a narrow construction of the right in the
criminal context will reduce the possibility of a successful Charter claim in other contexts. If a
particular form of electronic surveillance is held not to affect a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, then the state can use it to observe people for any reason, without engaging (much less
infringing) s. 8.
8
See also the overview of this topic in James A. Fontana & David Keeshan, The Law of
Search and Seizure in Canada, 7th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2007), at 5-29.
9
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Tessling”]; Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 25, per Deschamps J.
10
Gomboc, id., at para. 108, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., dissenting; Tessling, id., at
para. 19; R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Edwards”].
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the subject matter of the search;
the place searched;
whether the subject matter was in public view;
whether the subject matter was abandoned;
whether the subject matter was in the hands of third parties and
subject to a duty of confidentiality;
the degree of intrusiveness of the search; in cases of informational privacy, this factor refers especially to the question whether the technique revealed “any intimate details of the [accused’s]
lifestyle, or information of a biographical nature”;11, and
the legal framework for the search.

Moreover, the Court has identified three distinct but potentially overlapping types of privacy interests:
•
•
•

personal privacy, i.e., an individual’s interest in the privacy of his or
her body;
territorial privacy, i.e., a person’s interest in a particular physical
location, such as his or her home or office;
informational privacy, i.e., a person’s interest in records (such as
medical charts, banking statements, academic transcripts and patterns of computer usage) that reveal information about him or her.12

The factors relevant to the determination of a reasonable expectation of
privacy may play out differently depending on which kind of privacy
interest is at stake. For example, the question of abandonment would
rarely be relevant in connection with personal privacy, but is frequently a
point of contention in connection with informational privacy.
2. Two Approaches
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions reveal at least two, potentially incompatible, ways of orienting the factors in deciding whether a
particular accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
situation. I will call these the “risk approach” and the “surveillance
approach”.13 Under the risk approach, the focus of the inquiry is on the
11
Tessling, id., at para. 32; compare R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281,
at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Plant”].
12
Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 19; Tessling, supra, note 9, at paras. 21-24.
13
Lisa Austin has used the terms “descriptive” and “normative” for these two positions; she
has also called the first the “what did you expect” approach: Lisa M. Austin, “Information Sharing
and the ‘Reasonable Ambiguities’ of Section 8 of the Charter” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 499, at 506-10.
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security of the place searched (or information obtained) from intrusion
by the world at large. If the place searched is not in fact secure against
the world in general, then it is not secure against agents of the state in
particular, and so any expectation that the state will not intrude is not
reasonable. The accused, by failing to adequately secure his or her
interests against intrusions from the world at large, is deemed to have
accepted the potential intrusion on his or her privacy interests and so
cannot complain if the person who intrudes happens to be an agent of the
state.
The risk approach is well-illustrated by the reasoning and the outcome in Edwards14 and Patrick.15 In Edwards, the police obtained
evidence against the accused in the course of a police search of his
girlfriend’s apartment. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the
accused had no standing to argue for exclusion of the evidence because
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. He could not control access
to the apartment; he was, on the factual findings of the courts below, “no
more than an especially privileged guest” in the apartment.16 Why do
these facts matter? The Court does not explain that very clearly, but the
underlying idea seems to be that because he “could not be free from
intrusion or interference in [his girlfriend’s] apartment” by the world at
large, he could not object to intrusion or interference by the police. The
accused could not prevent his girlfriend, or a stranger, from discovering
evidence against him in the apartment and turning it over to the police;
he took the risk that the evidence would be discovered, so he could not
complain if the intruder was a police officer, even if the officer’s search
of the girlfriend’s apartment was blatantly unlawful.17 Similarly, in
Patrick, the accused was found to have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in bags of garbage left on his property, near the property line, for
pick-up. Although the garbage amounted to “bag[s] of ‘information’”
that could reveal a great deal about the accused’s activities within his
home,18 and although there was a municipal by-law that prohibited
anyone other than the garbage collectors from taking it,19 the accused
14

Supra, note 10.
R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patrick”].
16
Edwards, supra, note 10, at para. 47.
17
Id., at para. 51. The majority does not decide whether the search was unlawful; they hold
that the accused could not object to it under s. 8 even if it was unlawful. Justice La Forest,
concurring in the result, thought that the search was best described as a “constructive break-in” (at
para. 69).
18
Patrick, supra, note 15, at para. 30.
19
Id., at para. 68.
15
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was deemed to have abandoned any expectation of privacy he might
otherwise have had in the bag. Anyone could have picked it up, lawfully
or not:
The bags were unprotected and within easy reach of anyone walking
by in a public alleyway, including street people, bottle pickers, urban
foragers, nosey neighbours and mischievous children, not to mention
dogs and assorted wildlife, as well as the garbage collectors and
the police.20

That the garbage was picked up by the police, not a homeless person or a
raccoon (neither of whom would be likely to turn it over to the state),
was just a risk that the accused ran.
Under the surveillance approach, the focus of the inquiry is on the
question whether a reasonable person would anticipate that an agent of
the state would be able to intrude on the accused’s privacy interests with
no specific legal authority to do so. That a private party, or even a state
agent, might in fact have the ability to intrude is not determinative; that
the accused has accepted possible intrusions by non-state actors is not
determinative. The central concern is the impact of the state’s investigative technique on the accused’s privacy.
The classic exemplars of the surveillance approach are the Supreme
Court of Canada’s cases on electronic surveillance from the early 1990s.
Consider, for example, R. v. Duarte.21 The police installed audio-visual
recording equipment in an informer’s apartment. A conversation among
the accused, the informer, an undercover officer, and others was captured
by this equipment. The making of the recording was not unlawful
because the informer consented to the recording pursuant to what is now
s. 184(2)(a) of the Criminal Code;22 moreover, both the informer and the
undercover officer could have testified at trial to the content of their
conversations with the accused, pursuant to the hearsay exception for
party admissions.23 Nonetheless, a strong majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the accused had a reasonable expectation that his
conversations would not be recorded without judicial authorization. The
Court was concerned that if such an expectation was not recognized, the
20

Id., at para. 55.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Duarte”].
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; formerly s. 178.11(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
23
Compare R. v. Sanelli, [1987] O.J. No. 821, 61 O.R. (2d) 385, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont.
C.A.), revd Duarte, supra, note 21; see also R. v. Fliss, [2002] S.C.J. No. 15, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535
(S.C.C.), where an undercover officer’s testimony about his conversation with the accused was
admissible even though a recording of the conversation was excluded on Charter grounds.
21
22
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state would have an unfettered power “to make permanent electronic
recordings of our private communications”. The risk approach was
expressly considered and rejected. The flaw in the argument “that a man
has no one but himself to blame if he is confounded by his own words”24
was that it provided no effective check on the power of state agents to
conduct electronic surveillance of anyone, criminal or otherwise:
To countenance this practice would not strike only at the expectations
of privacy of criminals and those concerned with wrongdoing. Rather, it
would undermine the expectations of privacy of all those who set store
on the right to live in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance, be it electronic or otherwise.25

The risk of having one’s words reported by an informant or undercover
officer was “of a different order of magnitude” than the risk of having
one’s private conversations electronically recorded.
In some cases, the factors relevant to the reasonable expectation of
privacy may point in the same direction regardless of the approach
chosen. In R. v. Kang-Brown, 26 for example, the Court was unanimously
of the view that a passenger in a bus depot had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his luggage, and indeed a reasonable expectation of privacy
in any odours that, though undetectable by humans, were detectable by
sniffer dogs.27 The Court assumes rather than analyzing this expectation
of privacy, but it is supportable on either approach. The risk that nonhumans will detect odours from our luggage is not one that we take when
we put our suitcases in the belly of a bus. And the unsupervised use of
the technique would significantly compromise privacy interests in
luggage (who knows what other substances, lawful or unlawful, a dog
can be trained to detect?). But some cases are strongly affected by the
choice of approach. In Duarte, where the majority found a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the risk analysis supports the opposite conclusion
that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with the informant.28 In Edwards, where the majority found no
reasonable expectation of privacy, the surveillance approach might
support the opposite conclusion; a reasonable person would assume that
24

Duarte, id., at para. 38.
Id., at para. 41.
[2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”].
27
Though unanimous on this point, the Court was badly divided on the question whether
the police were authorized at common law to intrude on this expectation of privacy by using a sniffer
dog without a warrant.
28
Duarte, supra, note 21, at para. 58, per Lamer J. concurring in the result.
25
26
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the police would conduct themselves lawfully and so would not anticipate an unlawful search of his friend’s apartment. So there might be a
reasonable expectation of privacy against unlawful searches in general,
lest the state in its sole discretion could decide to violate the rights of
third parties for investigative purposes.29
3. Normative Foundations
Strikingly, none of the factors invoked in the standard methodology
for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy is explicitly normative; all of them are facts about the relationship between the accused and
the place searched or thing seized. But whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy is not a purely factual question because it is a
question of what ought to be the case. What ought to be done in any
given situation never depends solely on the facts, but always on the facts
in conjunction with the applicable norms. Thus, while normative conclusions are typically dependent on the facts,30 a normative conclusion
cannot be derived solely from the facts.31 So in deciding whether a
Charter applicant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a judge must
not only consider the presence or absence of the factors identified by the
Supreme Court of Canada, but also why and how those factors are
important in defining the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Put
another way, the ultimate normative question is whether, in light of the
impact of an investigative technique on privacy interests, it is right that
the state should be able to use that technique without any legal authorization or judicial supervision. Does our conception of the proper relationship between the investigative branches of the state and the individual
permit this technique without specific legal authorization? The facts of
the case are highly relevant to this normative question but do not by
themselves determine it.

29

Edwards, supra, note 10, at paras. 59 and 69, per La Forest J. concurring in the result.
As emphasized by A.K. Sen, “The Nature and Classes of Prescriptive Judgments” (1967)
17 Philosophical Quarterly 46.
31
As famously suggested in 1740, by David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, L.A.
Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), at 469-70; see, more recently, Scott J. Shapiro,
Legality (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2011), at 45-49. The long tradition that
questions the fact/value distinction typically does not claim that normative conclusions can be drawn
from facts alone, and so does not directly contradict Hume’s Law; instead, the key move is to
emphasize the common elements in reasoning about facts and in reasoning about norms: see, for
instance, Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality (London: Routledge, 2000).
30
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The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly recognized the normative
nature of the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As Binnie J.
put it in Tessling, “Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a
descriptive standard.”32 Moreover, some of the specific factors mentioned
in Tessling and Edwards, such as the intrusiveness of the search in relation
to the asserted privacy interest, seem intended to focus the judge’s attention on the desirability of permitting the unauthorized use of the technique.
And the choice between the risk approach and the surveillance approach,
or any other approach to determining the existence of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, ultimately depends on those foundations, that is, an
assessment of which approach better reflects the values supporting the
section 8 protection for the reasonable expectation of privacy.
Nevertheless, the Court has not been entirely clear about these normative foundations. The Court has, on a number of occasions, referred to
the individual interest in being left alone33 and to the values of autonomy,
freedom, dignity and integrity,34 but has not said a great deal about
exactly how these interests and values are protected by a reasonable
expectation of privacy. There are several ways to make that connection,
and indeed to relate the section 8 privacy interest to the fundamental
rights guaranteed in section 2 of the Charter. As Thomas Nagel, Lisa
Austin and others have argued, everyone needs a sphere that is private in
the sense of not being readily accessible to others; everyone needs
“respite from the public gaze” in order to be human.35 And there are at
least three reasons for this need. First, everyone expresses thoughts and
emotions, has experiences, and engages in activities that are for various
reasons not fit for public observation. The public presentation of oneself
involves restraint in the expression of emotions and attitudes; but
sometimes we need to dispense with restraint; “we need privacy to be
allowed to conduct ourselves in extremis in a way that serves purely
individual demands, the demands of strong personal emotion.”36 Many
activities, though perfectly ordinary and in no way inherently wrongful
or shameful — sleeping, using the toilet, cleaning oneself, dressing and
undressing — are considered embarrassing or humiliating if viewed by
32

Tessling, supra, note 9, at para. 42; see also Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 34.
Southam, supra, note 2, at 159 S.C.R.; Duarte, supra, note 21, at 49 S.C.R.
34
Plant, supra, note 11, at para. 17; R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R.
679, at paras. 89-90 and 98 (S.C.C.).
35
Lisa M. Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology” (2003) 22 Law & Philosophy
119, at 147 [hereinafter “Austin, ‘Privacy’”].
36
Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure” (1998) 27 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3,
at 19 [hereinafter “Nagel”].
33
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others.37 That is why surreptitious observation or recording of some of
these activities is a criminal offence.38 Some activities may be undertaken for pleasure or relaxation — sitting around in one’s underwear,
playing “air guitar”, singing really badly, reading comic books — yet
public observation or knowledge of them may be embarrassing or
inhibiting. And some pursuits may be exploratory or preparatory to a
public presentation, yet undertaken in private to prevent others from
drawing improper inferences from them. Practising the piano is often
preparation for a public performance; but the pianist typically does not
want the public to hear the slow, laborious and error-ridden process of
learning, repeating and experimenting that precedes the performance.
Similarly, the project of reading all the politically important books of the
20th century requires no legal justification, but publication of one’s
reading list might invite unwarranted speculation about why one is
reading How to be a Good Communist;39 and knowledge that one’s
reading lists would routinely be made available to state agents might
affect one’s reading choices.
Second, privacy enables intimate activities, that is, activities involving
small numbers of individuals who wish to interact with each other, but
only with each other. Sexual activity is the most obvious example: though
it is neither wrongful nor intrinsically shameful, most people require
privacy to engage in it.40 But there are many other examples. Musical
ensembles rehearse in private, for the same reasons as soloists. Most
people need a private space to engage in casual conversations in which
opinions may be stated in ways inappropriate for a public forum, perhaps
because they are stated too strongly or too absolutely or in ways that are
prone to be misunderstood, or because they are not fully considered.
Thus, privacy “protects two aspects of individuality: our ability to be
distinct individuals and our ability to have an authentic inner life and
intimate relationships”.41 And, in protecting these two aspects of individuality, privacy has a third function: it makes possible the construction
of a public persona through which the individual can participate in those
37
Id., at 18. I take no position on whether the reasons that these activities are embarrassing
are merely conventional or derive from more basic psychological or biological needs.
38
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 162(1). The offence is commonly known as
“voyeurism”.
39
Liu Shao-Chi, How to be a Good Communist (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951).
40
Nagel, supra, note 36, at 20; J. David Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame” (2001) 30
Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 [hereinafter “Velleman”]. Compare, again, s. 162(1) of the Criminal
Code.
41
Austin, “Privacy”, supra, note 35, at 147.
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institutions and conventions that make social and political life possible.
If there was no private space, the distinction between the individual and
his or her self-presentation would be obliterated, leaving no room for the
possibility of distinguishing one’s considered public behaviour, positions
and attitudes from one’s private activity. Moreover, the possibility of
surreptitious surveillance deprives the individual of control over how he
or she presents himself or herself to the rest of the world. Thus, privacy
enables not only activities typically thought of as private, but also those
typically thought of as public.42
All three of these functions of privacy would be seriously inhibited if
individuals were routinely exposed to the gaze of others. Yet all of them
are necessary to being human. And many of them are closely connected
with the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and
opinion protected by section 2(a) and (b) of the Charter. To be free to
think and to form beliefs and opinions requires not just public spaces for
expression and debate but also private spaces for thought and contemplation, for reading controversial and uncontroversial material alike, for
exploring with friends and colleagues ideas that may later be qualified or
rejected.43
We can now see why the surveillance approach is preferable to the
risk approach. The risk approach tends to underrate the interests protected by privacy because it focuses principally on the vulnerability of
one’s private space rather than on the value of that space. In contrast, the
surveillance approach takes the factors relevant to the reasonable
expectation of privacy and considers them in light of the interest in
maintaining a private space with (at least) these three functions of
enabling individuality, intimacy and self-presentation. The risk approach
often takes the fact that intrusion is empirically possible as decisively
eliminating any reasonable expectation of privacy; the surveillance
approach asks instead whether any given intrusion should be permitted
without legal authorization, in light of the inhibiting effects of the
intrusion on the activities protected by privacy.
Consider Duarte again. On the risk approach, the accused had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the recordings of his conversations
with the informant because there was nothing to stop the informant from
disclosing the conversations to the police. Justice La Forest rejected the
42
Velleman, supra, note 40, at 35-37; Lisa M. Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 165, at 202-204.
43
Austin, “Privacy”, supra, note 35, at 146.

346

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

argument that this risk destroyed the accused’s expectation of privacy
because he was concerned about the invasiveness on the private sphere
of unrestricted recording of private conversations. “No set of laws,” he
said, can protect us from the risk “that their interlocutors will divulge
communications that are meant to be private.”44 But electronic surveillance presented “the much more insidious danger inherent in allowing
the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words”:
… if the state were free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent
electronic recordings of our private communications, there would be no
meaningful residuum to our right to live our lives free from
surveillance. The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it
has the potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that
our communications will remain private. A society which exposed us,
at the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic
recording made of our words every time we opened our mouths might
be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which privacy
no longer had any meaning.45

Indeed, for the reasons La Forest J. gives, the logic behind the risk
approach could undermine long-standing and well-recognized protections for privacy in other areas. Suppose that the accused’s interlocutor in
Duarte had not been a police informant, but had gone to the police with
his concerns after the fact. From the accused’s point of view, the risk in
this hypothetical is the same as the risk in Duarte. But no-one seemed to
think that in the hypothetical a warrant would not be required to intercept
the conversation; while the Criminal Code clearly required one, if there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy, section 8 of the Charter would
not.46 Similarly, if Joe writes Bill a letter, there is nothing to stop Bill
from showing the letter to the police. But that does not mean Joe has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his mail. A warrant is undoubtedly
required to open it.47 And the risk (indeed, the likelihood) that a passerby might overhear me practising a Chopin nocturne is not at all the same
as the risk that the state might surreptitiously record all of my practice
sessions. The first is an unavoidable consequence of the impossibility of
44

Duarte, supra, note 21, at para. 21.
Id., at para. 22.
The interception would be unlawful under the Code, but would not violate s. 8 of the
Charter because it would not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy. A search has to be
lawful to be reasonable, but if the police conduct is not a search, the reasonableness — and therefore
the lawfulness — requirement does not apply.
47
See, for instance, R. v. Fry, [1999] N.J. No. 352, 142 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (Nfld. C.A.).
45
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perfect sound-proofing, while the prospect of the second would seriously
inhibit my preparation.
Now, the privacy interests protected by section 8, as I have described them, may seem weak in the typical search and seizure case
where the accused is growing marijuana in his basement or making
Ecstasy in his garage. These activities have little in common with those
protected by the interests in authenticity, intimacy and self-presentation
that I described above. But the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently maintained that the legality or illegality of the activity conducted
in a place does not affect the determination of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in that place; or, put another way, that the expectation of
privacy does not depend on the activity being conducted. Everyone has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her bedroom, whether that
bedroom is used for sleeping, sex, reading, playing air guitar, practising
the violin, growing marijuana, storing firearms or plotting a murder.
The reason is not to protect criminal activity; it is to protect lawful
activity from uncontrolled surveillance. Thus, the Court has consistently recognized that in order to protect the expectation of privacy in a
place such as the bedroom, the particular activity that occurs there is
not relevant.48
Moreover, no place (except, perhaps, the individual’s mind) is immune from search and seizure. The existence of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a place does not prevent that place from being searched;
rather, it requires some lawful authority for the search. So a person
carrying on an illegal activity in his home might well anticipate a search
of his home, not because that activity is illegal, but because it is likely to
generate publicly observable bits of evidence (the odour of marijuana,
the papered-over windows) giving rise to reasonable grounds on which to
obtain a search warrant.
Against this background, I turn to two 2010 cases where the Supreme Court of Canada had to determine whether the accused had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.

48
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at paras. 18-21 (S.C.C.); Patrick,
supra, note 15, at para. 32. See also R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297
(S.C.C.), where only one of seven judges thought that the illegality of the accused’s activity had any
effect on his reasonable expectation of privacy.
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III. R. V. NOLET
In Nolet,49 the two accused and another were driving in Saskatchewan in an apparently empty tractor-trailer. They were pulled over by an
RCMP officer for a regulatory spot-check. The spot-check developed
into a search of both the tractor and the trailer. After examining some
documents, the police officer picked up a duffle bag that he found
“behind the driver’s seat in the sleeping compartment” of the tractor. The
bag contained $115,000 in cash in small-denomination bills; on that
basis, the officer arrested the accused for possession of proceeds of
crime.50 A further warrantless search of the trailer, conducted some time
later, revealed a substantial quantity of marijuana in a hidden compartment. The two accused were charged with possession of marijuana for
the purpose of trafficking and other offences.
If the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cabin,
the police taking of the duffle bag would not have been a “search” for
section 8 purposes, and therefore would not have required any law to
authorize it. But the Court found that the accused had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sleeping area of the tractor “because living
quarters, however rudimentary, should not be classified as a Charter-free
zone”; though the expectation was “necessarily low” because the tractor
was “vulnerable to frequent random checks in relation to highway
transport matters”.51 This reasoning is brief but suggestive. The reference
to the possibility of frequent regulatory search may suggest a risk
analysis, but the Court’s reasoning is, for two reasons, better understood
as an instance of the surveillance approach. First, the fact that truck
drivers live in their cabs, albeit for short periods, gives them a privacy
interest in their cabs that is analogous to, if less strong, than the privacy
interest in the home, and so supports a requirement that the police have
some legal authority before searching a cab, notwithstanding the vulnerability of the cabin to regulatory scrutiny. Second, the “vulnerability” to
49

Supra, note 5.
Id., at para. 9.
Id., at para. 31. The phrase “Charter-free zone” neatly summarizes the concerns underlying the surveillance approach because a zone where the accused has no reasonable expectation of
privacy is one where he has no s. 8 rights. Since the accused did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, however low, the taking of the duffle bag was a search for s. 8 purposes and had to be
authorized by law; similarly for the search of the trailer. The Court held that the taking of the bag
was authorized by the officer’s power to search without a warrant in relation to provincial regulatory
offences and that the rest of the search was for the most part a valid incident of the arrest. (An
assessment of the Court’s reasoning on these points is beyond the scope of this paper.) The accused
had been acquitted at trial; a new trial was ordered.
50
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which the Court refers is not empirical vulnerability to the world at large;
rather, it is a vulnerability that arises as a matter of law because the
operation of a tractor-trailer is subject to a detailed regulatory scheme
that is itself justified on highway safety grounds. Indeed, the accused had
a much stronger expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the world in general
than vis-à-vis the RCMP officer who stopped them. An ordinary driver of
a private vehicle would have had no authority to stop them in the first
place; and if their vehicle was parked somewhere, a private individual
who broke into the trailer or the tractor would likely commit a number of
quite serious offences. But because the accused were engaged in a
regulated activity, the police had significant powers to stop and make
inquiries that substantially diminished their expectations of privacy. And
regulatory search powers must themselves be constitutionally valid; they
must satisfy the Hunter criteria52 or be based on considerations that
provide an adequate substitute for those criteria. The approach in Nolet is
encouraging precisely because it focuses on the legal setting of the
interaction with the police rather than on the accused’s empirical vulnerability to the world at large. The main issue in the case is the legality of
the police conduct, and that is as it should be; but that issue arises only
because the Court recognized the accused’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in the first place.

IV. R. V. GOMBOC
Nolet is mainly about search powers rather than about expectations of
privacy. Gomboc,53 in contrast, is a major decision on the reasonable
expectation of privacy. The significant differences of opinion in the Court
flow not from disagreement about the facts — which were not really in
issue — but from competing normative visions of the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy. While elements of the risk approach and the
surveillance approach can be discerned in all three sets of reasons for
judgment, the influence of the risk approach is strongest in the plurality
reasons of Deschamps J., while the influence of the surveillance approach
is strongest in the dissenting reasons of McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J.
The accused was charged with production of marijuana and other
offences. The Calgary police and the RCMP had made observations and
had gathered other information strongly suggesting the presence of a
52
53

Supra, note 2.
Supra, note 6.
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marijuana “grow-op” in a residence owned by the accused.54 The final
investigative step was to ask the accused’s electricity provider (the utility) to
attach a digital recording ammeter (“DRA”) to the power line. A DRA
measures the flow of current into a residence in one-amp increments over
time.55 The DRA remained in place for five days. The data it gathered
indicated a pattern of electricity use typical of a marijuana grow-op. These
data, together with the other observations made and information gathered by
the police, supported the issuance of a search warrant for the residence.
When the warrant was executed, the police seized a substantial quantity of
marijuana and evidence of a grow-op.
The accused argued that the warrantless use of the DRA violated his
section 8 right “to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”. He
therefore had to demonstrate that the use of the DRA intruded upon his
reasonable expectation of privacy; if so, its use would be a presumptively
unreasonable warrantless search, and, if the Crown could not demonstrate a lawful basis for it, would violate his section 8 right. The trial
judge found that the DRA did not intrude on the accused’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, admitted the evidence from the search, and
convicted the accused. The accused’s appeal to the Alberta Court of
Appeal was allowed on the basis that he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained from the DRA and that its
warrantless use was unlawful and so violated his section 8 right.56
The Crown’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was allowed
and the conviction was restored. A 7-2 majority held that the accused did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data obtained from
the DRA; however, the seven judges in the majority divided 4-3 as to
why that was so. It is therefore possible that on slightly different facts the
Court would divide 5-4 in favour of recognizing a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
Of the many factors relevant to determining the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, three were particularly important in
Gomboc. First, what does the DRA indicate about what is happening in a
home? There was no dispute that the DRA showed no more than, but also
54
The Crown conceded at trial that this information did not amount to reasonable grounds
for the issuance of a warrant. The wisdom of this concession has been questioned (Gomboc, id., at
para. 12), but it certainly had the effect of making the effect of the DRA on the accused’s privacy the
critical issue in the case.
55
Id., at para. 61.
56
The Court remitted the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
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no less than, the pattern of electricity consumption in the house over
time, and that the pattern would fairly reliably indicate whether or not the
house was being used for a marijuana grow-op.57 Second, what was the
place searched? The DRA was installed in a transformer box near, but
not on, the accused’s property; but it revealed information about what
was happening inside the house.58 Third, what was the legal setting for
the use of the DRA? There was no dispute about the terms and conditions
governing the accused’s contract with his electricity supplier: the
contract, in conjunction with the relevant Alberta regulation, permitted
the utility to share “customer information” with the police as long as “the
disclosure is not contrary to the express request of the customer.” The
accused Gomboc had made no such request.59
The way these factors are dealt with in the judgments indicates the
relative importance of the risk approach and the surveillance approach to
each group of judges. Justice Deschamps, for the four-judge plurality
(Charron, Rothstein, and Cromwell JJ. concurred), emphasized the
limited amount of information obtained from the DRA and therefore
characterized it as a relatively unintrusive technique.60 While the information obtained was information about activity in the accused’s home,
where the privacy interest is high, she commented that this fact “should
be not allowed to inflate the actual impact of the search”;61 information
about what is happening in a home is not automatically entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.62 Finally, she held that the utility
could, on its own initiative, have installed a DRA and turned the results
over to the police; thus, the accused could not reasonably consider these
data to be “confidential or private”.63 It made no difference that the
request to install the DRA came from the police.64
Justice Deschamps’s reasons draw on both the risk analysis and the surveillance approach, but the risk approach dominates. Given his failure to
request non-disclosure under the regulation, the accused was, empirically
speaking, vulnerable to the risk that the utility would gather and disclose
information to the police; that the police, rather than the utility, put this
process in motion made no difference. This reasoning is characteristic of the
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Gomboc, id., at paras. 7-9.
Id., at para. 4.
Id.,at para. 31; see also Code of Conduct Regulation, Alta. Reg. 160/2003, s. 10(3)(f).
Gomboc, id., at para. 36.
Id., at para. 50.
Compare Tessling, supra, note 9; Plant, supra, note 11; and Patrick, supra, note 15.
Gomboc, supra, note 6, at para. 41.
Id., at para. 42.
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risk approach; it is very similar to the “risk analysis” considered and
rejected in Duarte. But at the same time, the technique is characterized as
relatively unintrusive, so the need to constrain its unfettered use is
correspondingly diminished. In a case where an accused ran exactly the
same risk, but the information disclosed was plausibly characterized as
being at the biographical core that informational privacy protects, the
risk analysis and the surveillance approach would pull in different
directions.
And that was, more or less, how the three concurring judges saw it.
Justice Abella (Binnie and LeBel JJ. concurring) found the DRA to be
quite intrusive as it permitted the drawing of a “strong and reliable
inference” about what was going on “inside the home”.65 And because of
“the overriding significance of protecting the privacy interests in one’s
home”, there was reason to be concerned about allowing the police to use
this investigative technique with no judicial oversight.66 Thus, most of
the factors pushed in the direction of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, Abella J. refrained from expressly stating this
conclusion because even if it was correct there was, in her view, a factor
that weighed decisively against recognizing a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Because the accused had not requested confidentiality under the
regulation, any expectation of privacy that he might have had was not
objectively reasonable.67
Justice Abella’s analysis of the relevant factors is much closer to surveillance approach than the plurality’s. She sees the DRA as a device for
determining what is going on inside the home, and therefore as properly
subject to legal regulation. This reasoning is typical of the surveillance
approach; it is not the accused’s empirical vulnerability to intrusion but
the effect on privacy of permitting the intrusion without any legal
authority that matters. Justice Deschamps treated the accused’s failure to
request confidentiality as merely one factor in assessing his reasonable
expectation of privacy; thus, even if he had so requested, she might have
been prepared to find no expectation of privacy. In contrast, Abella J.
treats the failure to request confidentiality as nearly decisive, indicating
that she would likely have found a reasonable expectation of privacy if
the accused had so requested. To put this point another way, suppose the
accused had requested confidentiality but the utility had, on its own
65
66
67

Id., at paras. 81 and 80 (emphasis in the original).
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at paras. 82-95.
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initiative and contrary to the regulation, gathered the information and
then disclosed it to the police. Would the accused’s section 8 rights have
been infringed? Justice Deschamps suggests that they would not, because
the DRA did not record “household activities of an intimate or private
nature that form part of the inhabitants’ biographical core data”,68 so the
accused would have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
DRA information. Justice Abella in contrast, suggests not only that the
DRA did gather such core information, but also that for the police to
obtain it in defiance of the customer’s express wishes would be an
unlawful search: “A request by a customer to prohibit disclosure of
customer information revokes the legislative authority for its disclosure.”69 Moreover, she left open the possibility of challenging the
regulation as an unreasonable law under section 8 of the Charter,70 a
challenge which would be pointless if the regulation was not in essence a
law authorizing search and seizure of information that would otherwise
be protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Fish J. dissented. They agreed with
much of Abella J.’s analysis, but went further and held that the DRA
disclosed information that was subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.71 But, unlike Abella J., they held that the regulation did not
defeat that expectation. In contrast to Nolet, where the reasonable trucker
would be aware of the regulatory scheme governing trucking, “[t]he
average consumer signing up for electricity cannot be expected to be
aware of the details of a complex regulatory scheme … especially where
a presumption of awareness operates to, in effect, narrow the consumer’s
constitutional rights.”72 Thus, the accused had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the information obtained from the DRA. The use of the
DRA was a search for section 8 purposes.73
68

Id., at para. 36.
Id., at para. 85. Justice Binnie concurred with Abella J. here, but contrast his reasons in
Patrick, supra, note 15, where he held that the police’s failure to respect a by-law prohibiting
garbage-picking had no effect on the accused’s expectation of privacy in his garbage.
70
Gomboc, id., at paras. 86-91.
71
Id., at paras. 105 and 124.
72
Id., at para. 139. Justice Abella suggests that this consideration would subjectivize the
analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy: at para. 93. Yet the dissenters are clearly concerned
not with Gomboc’s knowledge, but with the reasonable person’s likely awareness, of the regulation:
id., at para. 142.
73
The dissenters went on to hold that there was no lawful authority for the search; consequently, the accused’s s. 8 rights were violated. The dissenters would have remitted the case for
further argument on the question whether the evidence obtained from the DRA (and from the
physical search that followed) should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
69
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The dissenters are strongly motivated by the normative concerns that
underlie the surveillance approach. The DRA enables the person analyzing the data it generates to make an informed prediction as to “whether
anyone is home, the approximate time at which the occupants go to bed
and wake up, and … [the] particular appliances being used” as well as
whether plants are being grown.74 If there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that information, if the police can ask the utility to disclose it
without reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has occurred and
that the information will disclose evidence of the offence, could not the
police also, without reasonable grounds, ask a cable company to gather
information on what programs a person is watching, or a plumber to
gather information about the contents of a person’s bathroom while in a
person’s home for the stated purpose of repairing a toilet?75 The dissenters see the plurality’s decision as “an incremental but ominous step
toward the erosion of the right to privacy guaranteed by section 8”76
because they fear that the majority’s approach will be unable to distinguish such cases from the situation in Gomboc itself. There is nothing
wrongful or shameful about a person’s pattern of sleeping and waking, or
about the contents of a person’s bathroom cupboard, but it is no one’s
business either. One can assume that watching a television program via a
regulated provider such as Bell or Rogers is always lawful (otherwise
they would not be permitted to broadcast it), but for the state to keep
records of what people watch is likely to inhibit their Charter-protected
interests in freedom of thought, opinion and expression. Who would not
be affected in their choice of what to watch, or when to sleep, or what to
keep in the cupboard, by the knowledge that the state, in its unfettered
discretion, could keep track? These examples may seem remote from the
DRA that was at issue in Gomboc, but the logic of the risk approach
makes it hard to distinguish them. The surveillance approach is much
more likely to protect the values underlying the section 8 privacy interest
because it more effectively takes into account the concern about unfettered intrusion into areas where individuals are likely to engage in, or to
leave information about, the activities that are central to the privacy
interest protected by section 8.
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Id., at paras. 128-129.
Id., at para. 100.
Id., at para. 97.
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 8 of the Charter protects a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The reason for protecting a reasonable expectation of privacy is to create
a zone of privacy in which every individual can engage in activities that
are essential to the making of the human self but that are often considered shameful or embarrassing, and may be seriously inhibited, if
routinely recorded or exposed to observation by others. The Supreme
Court of Canada’s methodology for determining the existence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy contains two dominant methodological
strands — the risk approach, which focuses on the factual vulnerability
of the place or the information, and the surveillance approach, which
focuses on concerns about unfettered use of the technique in question. In
Gomboc, these two competing approaches come face to face. The
investigative technique at issue is a device that records the pattern of
electricity use over time. Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in
this information? The four-judge plurality regards the information itself
as relatively unintrusive, but is also moved by the relative ease with
which it could be gathered by the utility, while apparently remaining
unconcerned about the impact of this kind of observation on the values
protected by the right to privacy. In contrast, the remaining five judges,
like La Forest J. in Duarte, recognize that the relative ease of gathering
information about what is going on in a home through techniques of
electronic surveillance does not mean that the inhabitants of the home
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is not the ease of information-gathering, but its impact on the human interests in authenticity,
intimacy and self-presentation that should be protected by section 8 of
the Charter, and should drive the question of the reasonable expectation
of privacy.

